Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Charles C. Garlett v. Jennifer T. Garlett : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Happy Morgan; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee.
Mary C. Corporon; Jarrod H. Jennings; Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Garlett v. Garlett, No. 20010218 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3181

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES C. GARLETT,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Case No. 20010218-CA
JENNIFERS GARLETT,
Priority No. 15
Respondent/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE, ENTERED IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON PRESIDING.
MARY C. CORPORON (734)
JARROD H. JENNINGS (8431)
CORPORON AND WILLIAMS
808 E. SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
(801)328-1162
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

HAPPY J. MORGAN (7586)
8 SOUTH 100 EAST
MOAB, UTAH 84532
(435)259-9418
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES C. GARLETT,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Case No. 20010218-CA
JENNIFER!. CJAKLfc I I,
Priority No. 15
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF
DIVORCE, ENTERED IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF I ITAM TWP
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON PRESIDING.

MARY C. CORPORON (734)
JARROD H. JENNINGS (8431)
CORPORON AND WILLIAMS
808 E. SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
(801)328-1162
IIOUNSHL. FOR /MM »I I I AN I

HAPPY J. MORGAN (7586)
8 SOUTH 100 EAST
MOAB, UTAH 84532
(435)259-9418
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

1

STATUTES AND RULES

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE, NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF
PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS PERTINENT TO APPEAL

7

ARGUMENTS:
I.
This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Income Assessment....
II.
This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Denial of the Motion for a
New Trial
III.
This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Alimony Award
IV.
This Court Should Award Attorney's Fees on Appeal
CONCLUSION
ADDENDA:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.

Utah Code Ann. §30-1 -17.2
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
Utah Code Ann. §78-25-18
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5
Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-1
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 40
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3

11
21
27
36
39

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Boyce v. Boyce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980)
26
Breinholtv.Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995)
19
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)
3
Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App.) cert denied 800 P.2d 1105
(Utah 1990)
2,3,4,12,24,26,27
Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987)
38
Grayson v. Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989)
12,28
Mauqhan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989)
36
Ostler v.Buhler. 957 P.2d 205 (Utah 1998)
26
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)
13,29
Sanders v. Leavitt. 2001 UT 78,429 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
4
Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App 370,995 P.2d 14, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289
(Utah 2000)
13,28
State in re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990)
21,22,23,25
State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984)
1
Utah Med. Prods, v. Searcv. 958 P.2d 228 (Utah 1998)
13,28
Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 fUtah App. 1992)
1,3
STATUTES, R U L £ $ AND CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-17.2
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3
Utah Code Ann. §78-25-18 (1996)
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-18 (1996)
Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-1
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 40
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3
OTHER
Black's Law Dictionary. "Lord Mansfield's Rule"

4,21
4,33
1
4,22
4,16,19,37
4,21
4
4,21,22
2,3,4,12,25,26,27
4,36
4,36
4,36
1,2,3,4,12,27
4,23
4,23
4
4
5

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES C. GARLETT,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Case No. 20010218-CA
JENNIFER T. GARLETT.
Priority No. 15

Respondent/Appellee.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this
divorce case.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARDS OF
APPELLATE REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES1
Issue 1. Are the trial court's findings that Mr. Garlett did and could make at
least $50,000 a year adequate?
This issue is governed by the deferential abuse of discretion standard of
review. £§§. &&, Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992). Findings
of fact are not to be reversed unless clearly erroneous, after granting the trial
court's ability to assess witness credibility due regard. See, e.g.. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).
1
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Opening Brief of Appellant addresses a fourth issue regarding the trial court's
division of marital assets. §ge_ ig\ at 2,7-8. Because this issue is not briefed or
analv7ed in the arnument sentinn nf the Annellant's Brief Annellee does not
J
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respond to that issue, and the Court need not address it. £g£, e ^ , State v.
Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)(court will not address issues unless
thev are briefed DronerlvV

Nowhere in the appellant's opening brief does he make a claim that any
issue was preserved for appeal, guises Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24
(a)(5)(A) and (B) (requiring that the opening brief identify record location where
each issue was preserved in the trial court, or articulate a basis for reviewing
issues not raised in the trial court).
Mr. Garlett did not object to the trial court's memorandum decision entered
July 10, 2000, which included the trial court's first analysis of this issue (R. 59).
Nor did Mr. Garlett raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial court's analysis
in his motion for a new trial filed September 21, 2000, nor did he file any objection
to the trial court's findings and conclusions, which reflects the analysis challenged
on appeal and was filed on February 21, 2001 (R. 122-123). _Byt see Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 52 (permitting parties to move the trial court within ten days of
the final judgment to amend findings or make additional findings, permitting such
a motion to be made in conjunction with motion for a new trial).
Because Mr. Garlett did not notify the trial court of the error claimed on
appeal despite having had ample opportunity to do so, the issue is not preserved
for appeal. See, e.g.. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)(party must object in a clear and concise fashion and
thereby give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue).
Issue 2. Did the trial court correctly reject Mr. Garlett's attempt to disavow
his paternity of his six-year-old-daughter in a motion for a new trial, when the
record proves that Garlett knew well before trial that he may not have been the
biological father of that child, and chose to capitalize on his paternity of the child
during the trial?
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed with deference
for an abuse of discretion. §ee, ej^, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789,

2

799 (Utah 1991).
While Mr. Garlett does not establish preservation of this issue in his brief, it
appears that the issue was preserved by the filing of the motion for a new trial.
See Doe v. Hafen. supra.
Issue 3. Are thefindingsunderlying the alimony award adequate?
This issue is governed by the deferential abuse of discretion standard of
review. See, e.g.. Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992). Findings
of fact are not to be reversed unless clearly erroneous, after granting the trial
court's ability to assess witness credibility due regard. See, e4k, Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).
Nowhere in the appellant's opening brief does he make a claim that any
issue was preserved for appeal. Byi §ee Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24
(a)(5)(A) and (B) (requiring that the opening brief identify record location where
each issue was preserved in the trial court, or articulate a basis for reviewing
issues not raised in the trial court).
Mr. Garlett did not object to the trial court's memorandum decision entered
July 10, 2000, which included the trial court's first analysis of this issue (R. 59-62).
Nor did Mr. Garlett raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial court's analysis
in his motion for a new trialfiledSeptember 21, 2000, nor did hefileany objection
to the trial court's findings and conclusions, which reflects the analysis challenged
on appeal and wasfiledon February 21, 2001 (R. 122-124). _Byi see Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 52 (permitting parties to move the trial court within ten days of
the final judgment to amend findings or make additional findings, permitting such
a motion to be made in conjunction with motion for a new trial).
Because Mr. Garlett did not notify the trial court of the error claimed on
appeal despite having had ample opportunity to do so, the issue is not preserved
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for appeal. See, g ^ , Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App.), eejt denied.
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)(party must object in a clear and concise fashion and
thereby give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue).
Issue 4: Should this Court order Mr. Garlett or his counsel to pay Mrs.
Garlett's fees on appeal?
This issue was not raised in the trial court, and is not subject to appellate
review, but presents an issue directly to this Court. £ L e ^ , Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33 (discussing award of attorney's fees on appeal); Sanders
v. Leavitt. 2001 UT 78 at ffll 34-35; 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (same).
STATUTES AND RULES2
The following statutes and rules pertain, and appear in the addendum to
this brief: Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2; Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5; Utah Code Ann. §
78-25-18 (1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7; Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5; Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-18 (1996);Utah Code Ann. §78-45a-1; Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24; Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33; Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 40; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ;Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52;
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60; Utah Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.1; Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION

2

The Appellant's Brief claims that "[tjhere is no case law nor statutory
authority believed by the Petitioner to be wholly dispositive of the issues raised on
appeal." Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, but then relies on numerous statutes
and rules in the argument of his brief. See. e,a. page iii of Mr. Garlett's table of
contents, i y l see. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) (requiring citation
to and quotation of "[constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal").

4

Mr. Garlett, through counsel, Gene Byrge,filedfor divorce on the basis of
irreconcilable differences (R. 1-2).
In the trial, Mr. Garlett sought full custody of all three Garlett children, and
asked for joint physical custody in the alternative (R. 146 at 45-46). He testified
regarding, and called witnesses to establish, his close relationship with and fine
parenting of all three Garlett children (&& R. 146 at 8-9,110-113,129).
During the trial, when Mr. Garlett was asked why he had not accepted a
construction project in October of 1999 (R. 146 at 12), he stated that he had just
learned some things about his youngest child (R. 146 at 28). When counsel for
Mrs. Garlett objected and raised Lord Mansfield's rule,3 counsel for Mr. Garlett
stated that she had no problem steering away from that particular area (R. 146 at
28).
Mr. Garlett made no effort to challenge the paternity of any child during the
trial, and his counsel asked Mrs. Garlett no question on this topic.
Mr. Garlett proposed that the trial court order the family home sold so that
he could buy a new home with a bedroom for each child following the divorce
(e.g. R. 76).
After the trial court rejected Mr. Garlett's proposal and ruled that the
children would be staying in the family home with Mrs. Garlett until the youngest
child reached the age of eighteen, Mr. Garlett hired new counsel, who filed a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, taking issue with the paternity of the youngest Garlett child, and
with the trial court's awarding child support for this child and delaying the sale of

3

Lord Mansfield's rule "renders inadmissible testimony hv either

spouse on the question of whether the husband had access to the wife at the
time of conception." Black's Law Dictionary.
5

the family home until this child reached the age of eighteen (R. 73-74). Attached
to the motion were DNA test results, but no affidavit explaining why the test
results should be considered newly discovered evidence (R. 73-74, 76). The
motion alleged alternatively that the court should grant relief from judgment under
the catchall provision of rule 60, claiming that Mrs. Garlett's claims for child
support were fraudulent, inasmuch as she should reasonably have known that
Mr. Garlett was not the biological father of the child (R. 74).
In the verified response to and objection to the motion for new trial, Mrs.
Garlett asserted that Mr. Garlett was well aware prior to trial that he may not have
been the biological father of the youngest Garlett child, but wished to have a
continuing relationship with the child (R. 77-83). Because the DNA test results did
not constitute newly discovered evidence, Mrs. Garlett sought attorney's fees in
defending against the motion (R. 77-83).
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial in an order stating,
Petitioner Charles S. Garlett ("Charles") has moved for a new
trial, asserting the discovery of evidence that he is not the father of
one of the children. I hat motion is supported by no affidavit.
Respondent Jennifer T. Garlett ("Jennifer") has submitted a verified
response asserting that Charles was weii aware of the possibility - or
even probability - that he was not the father of one of the children.
Charles has submitted no reply, nor any affidavit supporting his
assertion that the evidence is newly discovered.
The motion for new trial is denied. Because the motion has so
little merit, the court exercises its discretion in domestic relations
cases to award Jennifer her fees in responding to the motion.
Counsel for Jennifer should submit an affidavit with her proposed
order pursuant to Rule 4-504.
(R. 88).
On July 10, 2000, the trial court entered a memorandum decision analyzing
the parties' income, and calculating child support and alimony (R. 57-64), and his
findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of divorce,filedSeptember 21,
2000, reflect the same analysis as originally appeared in the memorandum

6

decision (R. 118-134;111-117).
Mr. Garlett did nm challenge the trial court's analysis or findings in the
motion for a new trial, or in any other motion, as permitted by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52.
< m appeal, Mr Garlett challenges the trial court's denial of the motion for a
new trial, and for the first time challenges the adequacy of the trial i .i..n s imdings
regarding Mr. Garlett's income

alimony award.

STATEMENT OF FACTS PERTINENT TO APPEAL
Charles S. Garlett married Jennifer Garlett on August 6,1983, and they
have three children born of the marriage: a son, Travis, bom on September 28,
1987, a daughter Corrie, born on August 15,1990, and a daughter, Taylor, bom
on May 11,1994 (R. 146 at 7-8).
Mr. Garlett is a construction contractor who has built thirty-eight homes in
the Moab area since he got his contractor's license in 1987 fh' ' 4<> al I«, '' l!

He

has the reputation as one of Moab's finest builders (R. 146 at 15).
He testified that there was construction work available, and the parties
stipulated that there is a lot of construction going on in Moab now (R. 146 at 74,
114).4

4

At one point, he claimed that he had no work lined up after his four
month project building a house for Peter Bird, because he had had no one hire
him, despite making efforts to find work (R. 146 at 26-27). He attributed this
decline in business to his moving to Heber for a couple of months, and to Mrs.
Garlett's taking a message off their machine telling people how to reach him (R.
146 at 27).
However, the evidence showed that at the time of trial. Mr. Garlett was also
building a home for Roma and Jay Knuth without compensation, with the
expectation that he would later purchase the home from them at a very low cost,
or would be paid for his labor if he could not buy the home (R. 146 at 130,132).
Mr. Garlett also planned to do a roofing side job for someone else while he

7

Mrs. Garlett has been a full time mother to the three Garlett children, and
only occasionally has worked part time in minimum wage positions, which were
largely seasonal in the resort town of Moab (R. 146 at 16-17,180,193). Mr.
Garlett conceded that Mrs. Garlett has the wage-earning power of a high school
student (R. 146 at 82).
He was willing to pay alimony and child support on the basis of their ability
to earn (R. 146 at 104), and Mr. Garlett asked the court to base his child support
and alimony on average annual income from 22 to 38 thousand a year, based on
his income tax returns (R. 146 at 30-31).
However, he conceded that in 1997 and 1998, he had "fudged" his taxes,
underestimating his income by about $5,000 by increasing the amount of his
costs (R. 146 at 104-105).5
Mr. Garlett's trial counsel asked the trial court tofindthat Mr. Garlett's
monthly income was $3,000 (R. 146 at 230). This request was likely based on
the fact that during the trial, Garlett was building a "spec" home for Peter Bird,
who was paying him $3,000 a month (R. 146 at 26).

was working on the Bird home (R. 146 at 223).
Tim Smith tried to hire Mr. Garlett as a construction contractor in
September or October of 1999, but he would not accept the work because of his
divorce-related problems (R. 146 at 12).
Mr. Garlett testified that he had turned down a lot of work in the past, but
could not think of any he had rejected besides the project for Mr. Smith (R. 146 at
87-88).
5

Mr. Garlett's self employment as a builder and contractor may have
facilitated his diminished income records. For instance, Mr. Garlett got one of his
trailers as partial payment on a job (R. 146 at 177), and was building a home
without ostensible compensation at the time of trial with the understanding that he
could buy the house he was building for a very good price after the divorce (R.
146 at 130,132).
S

However, the evidence showed that at the same time, Mi Garlett was also
building a home for Ror

>ay Knuth without ostensible compensation,6 with

the expectation that he would later purchase the home from them ,ii i w i v "ow
cost, or would be paid for his labor if he < <»iin i»n tt>• v ihe home (R. 146 at 130,
132). Mr. Garlett also planned to do a roofing side job for someone else while he
was working on the Bird home (R. 146 at 223).
Mr. Garlett's business and family finances all ran through one checking
account, which was managed primarily by Mrs. Garlett (R. 146 at 19). In 1996,
$291,886 was deposited; in 1997, $191,910 was deposited in I'WH $113,289
was deposited; in 1999, $222, 970 was deposited (R. 146 at 86-87).
Mr. Garlett provided no specific testimony concerning how much of this
money went out to cover business expenses,

lan testifying that in 1999,

nearly a quartet .n .t million dollars went through the account, but he kept slightly
under $39,000 (R. 146 at 25). While Mr. Garlett submitted several lengthy tax
returns, Mr. Garlett provided no fixpeil testimony to explain them, and did not
testify regarding their specific contents or what they were submitted to prove. He
admitted that he "fudged" his taxes in two years covered in the tax returns (R. 146
at 104-105).
He testified that he had no idea how much the family spent each year
because Mrs. Garlett ran the checking ace*
She estimated that their family spent between $50,000 and $80,000 a year
(R 1m. al 164).
The evidence established that their fami;
lifestyle The ''

'

five lived a very comfortable

1,657 square foot home on one and a half acres of land,

The Knuths had loaned him $17,000
146 at 43).

9

S.HU.P

»hp f"\l i •' Ihe year (R

worth $180,000 to $185,000, and had no mortgage on it (R. 146 at 38, 137-38).
They had about $9,000 in equity in a vacant lot worth about $60,000 which lot
was large enough to subdivide (R. 146 at 41,114). They had no credit card debt
(R. 146 at 106). Mrs. Garlett always drove nice new cars and Mr. Garlett had just
put down $20,000 in cash on a new Dodge pickup truck worth around $27,000 (R.
146 at 36-37, 58, 74, 85). They had a 20 foot Stratus boat and a 1993 Kit Road
Ranger 27 foot trailer, for which he had paid $25,000 and upon which they owed
between 8 and 9 thousand (R. 146 at 31,73). They had a fifth wheel trailer
which they gave to her parents (R. 146 at 32).
Mrs. Garlett took numerous trips to Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Las
Vegas, Phoenix, Denver, New Mexico, and Cancun, and hadfilledthe house and
garage with nice furnishing and other things she had purchased (R. 146 at 97-99).
Mr. Garlett had six or seven guns worth around $1,500 andfishingtackle
worth about $4,500, and took his bassfishingboat to Lake Powell, and
participated in bassfishingcontests, an expensive hobby (R. 146 at 73-74, 93).
Their property is further described in Respondent's Exhibit 18, the
Proposed Settlement.
The Garlett children participated in all manner of sporting events, dancing
and recreation (R. 146 at 212).
Mrs. Garlett submitted Exhibit 17, a detailed list of expenses for her and the
children totaling $2134.50 a month in expenses, which did not include vacations
(R. 146 at 166).
At the time of trial, Mr. Garlett was living in his trailer at the Knuth
construction site, and the only testimony he provided about hisfinancialexpenses
was that he was paying his new romantic interest $400 a month (R. 146 at 53,
130-31, 217). He submitted Exhibit 14, afinancialdeclaration, listing his monthly
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net income at $2154,his total monthly expenses at $2,586 *•
payments at $275.12. Ace

monthly

is document, Mr. Gariett was spending

$707.24 per month more than he was making, without any provisions for his
family - a position that is radically inconsistent with the Gariett family lifestyle.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant has waived the issues concerning the adequacy of the trial
court's findings regarding his income and the alimony award by failing to object to
the trial court's analysis or to seek amended findings in the trial court.
While Appellant acknowledges his burden to marshal the

"i

supports the trial court's rulings on his income and alimony, he has failed to
marshal the evidence, and barely cites to the record at all. This provides an
additional basis for assuming the regularity of the proceedings below.
The trial <<:•<>'i s 'ulings are supported by the record, and to the extent that
the findings are lacking In specificity, this is directly attributable to the failure of Mr.
Gariett to provide reliable, intelligible evidence on pom I
The trial court correctly denied the motion for a new trial, where the record
establishes that Mr. Gariett was aware prior to trial that he was not the biological
father of his youngest child, and uhnsr io capitalize on his role as her father at
trial.
Because Mr. Garlett's appeal is legally frivolous, this Court should order
him or his counsel to pay twice the total of Mrs. Garlett's fees on appeal.
ARGUMENTS

L
This Court Should Affirm
The Trial Court's Income Assessment.
A. Waiver
Mr. Gariett did not object to the tri

emorandum decision entered
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July 10, 2000, which included the trial court'sfirstanalysis of Mr. Gariett's income
(R. 59). Nor did Mr. Garlett raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial court's
analysis in his motion for a new trial filed September 21,2000, nor did he file any
objection to the trial court's findings and conclusions, which reflects the analysis
challenged on appeal and was filed on February 21, 2001 (R. 122-123). Bui
see Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (permitting parties to move the trial court
within ten days of the final judgment to amendfindingsor make additional
findings, permitting such a motion to be made in conjunction with motion for a
new trial).
On appeal, he has made no claim of plain error, or otherwise justified this
Court's consideration of this issue for the first time on appeal.
Because Mr. Garlett did not notify the trial court of the error claimed on
appeal despite having had ample opportunity to do so, the issue is not preserved
for appeal. §gg, g ^ , Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456,458 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)(party must object in a clear and concise fashion and
thereby give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue).
B. Failure to Marshal the Evidence
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(9) provides, "A party challenging a
factfindingmustfirstmarshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding." A party must assemble all evidence supporting the trial court's findings
of fact and demonstrate that, even when all reasonable inferences are drawn in
conformity with the findings, thefindingsare clearly erroneous. See, e ^ ,
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467,470 (Utah 1989).
Mr. Garlett acknowledges his duty to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court'sfindingsregarding Mr. Gariett's income, but fails to marshal the
evidence, and instead mischaracterizes and criticizes the trial court's findings,
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which he tellingly never even quotes in his argument. See Opening Brief of
Appellant at 8-9.
Because he has failed to marshal the evidence, this Court may assume
that the evidence sustains the trial court'sfindings.See, e ^ , Utah Med. Prods,
v. Searcv. 958 P

) (Utah 1998)(because party failed to marshal

evidence court was required to assume that the evidence sustained the findings).
See also Smith v. Smith. 1999

995 P.2d 14; cert, denied, 4 P.3d

1289 (Utai.
2000)(party may not shift burden of analysis to the appell;
C. Marshaling the evider
The trial court's findings of fact state, in relevant part,
10. The Petitioner has maintained that his income has
averaged about $30,000.00 per year and his federal income tax
returns reflect income in that range for 1994-1998, however the
lifestyle and standard of living of the parties supports the position of
ihe Kespondeni ihat the family spent $50,000.uu to $80,000.00 per
year.
11. The Petitioner maintains thai he had had difficulty
maintaining his business during the past year because of the stress
of the divorce. However, he has turned down at least one
opportunity to do significant work because he did not think he could
do it justice in his present state. Nevertheless, he has received
$28,000.00 for his services during the first seven months of the year
2000, $11,000.00 in direct compensation from Pete Byrd, and
$17,000.00 in loans form Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is
building a home. The Court is persuaded that any reduction in the
income of the Petitioner is the product of this conscious choice. The
Courtfindsthat the Petitioner is capable of earning, and has actually
earned, at least $50,000 per year. His child support obligation will be
based on the assumption that he earns $50,000 per year.
(R 122 123).
In assessing the trial court's reasonir

.so appropriate to refer to his

original memorandum decision. £gg, e.g.. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96,102
(Utah 1986)(assessing supplementalfindingsof fact and conclusions of law and
the trial court's memorandum decision m .i divorce case)
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The portion of the memorandum decision addressing Mr. Garlett's income
states,
Chuck maintains that his income has averaged about $30,000
per year. His federal income tax returns reflect incomes in that range
for 1994-98. He admits "fudging" his income by $5,000 during at
least two of those years. Jennifer claims that trie family spent
$50,000 to $80,000 per year. The court has heard testimony about
the possessions accumulated by Chuck and Jennifer, as well as
their lifestyle, andfindsJennifers position better supported by that
evidence. Chuck maintains that the has had difficulty maintaining his
business during the past year because of the stress of the divorce.
He admits to turning down at least one opportunity to do significant
work because he did not think he could do it justice in his present
state. Nevertheless,
he has received $28,000 for his services so far
in 2000,[7] $11,000 in direct compensation from Pete Byrd, and
$17,000 in loans from Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is building
a home. The court is persuaded that any reduction in Chuck's
income is the product of this conscious choice. It is not unusual to
see claims that business has gone down when alimony or child
support are about to be calculated. Chuck is capable of, earning,
and has actually earned, at least $50,000 per year. His child support
obligation wiii be based on the assumption that he earns $50,000 per
year. Jennifer has sought employment, but has limited skills and has
not qualified for jobs paying more than minimum wage. Her
employment has been seasonal as well. Taking the seasonality of
her employment into account, as well as her need to be home to
care for the children when they are not in school, the court will base
Jennifer's child support calculation on the expectation that she will
earn minimum wage for 30 hours per week. Jennifer will be entitled
to the tax exemption and credits for the children, but Chuck may
purchase them from her annually by paying her what they save her in
taxes.
(R. 59-60).
The evidence amply supports the trial court's analysis and findings. Mr.
Garlett asked the court to base his child support and alimony on average annual
income from 22 to 38 thousand a year, based on his income tax returns (R. 146
at 30-31).
However, he conceded that in 1997 and 1998, he had "fudged" his taxes,

7

The trial court's memorandum decision entered July 10, 2000 (R.
63), and the trial was on June 27,2000 (R. 52).
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underestimating his income by about $5,000 by increasing Ihu dniinjnl i?l his
costs (R. 146 at 104-105).8
Mr. Garlett's trial counsel asked the trial court to find that Mr. Garlett's
monthly income was $3,000 (R. 146 at 230). This request was likely based on
the fact that d'

-i

jarlett was building a "spec" home for Peter Bird,

who was paying him $3,000 a month (R. 146 at 26).
However, the evidence showed iiiiii ;u the same time, Mr. Garlett was also
buildina ~ home for Roma and Jay Knuth without compensation,9 with the
expectation that he would later purchase the home from ther

t very low cost,

or would be paid for his labor il he \ uuld not buy the home (R. 146 at 130,132).
Mr. Garlett also planned to do a roofing side job for someone else while he was
working on the Bird home (R. 146 at 223).
Mr. Garlett's Fxhrb>l M , afinancialdeclaration, listing his monthly net
income at $2154,his total monthly expenses at $2,586.12 and his monthly
payments at $275.12, further demonstrates that the trial court acted well within
his discretion in choosing not to rely on Mr. Garlett's assessment of his income.
According to this document, Mr. Garlett was spending $707.2*

ro

than he was making, without any provisions for his family - a position that is
radically inconsistent with the Garlett family lifestyle.

8

Mr. Garlett's self employment as a builder and contractor may have
facilitated his diminished income records. For instance, Mr. Garlett got one of his
trailers as partial payment on a job (R. 146 at 177), and was building a home
without ostensible compensation at the time of trial with the understanding that he
could buy the house he was building for a very good price after the divorce (R.
146 at 130,132).
The Knuths had loaned him $17,000 since the first "f Ihe year (R.
14o mto).
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Mr. Garlett's business and family finances all ran through one checking
account, which was managed primarily by Mrs. Garlett (R. 146 at 19). In 1996,
$291,886 was deposited; in 1997, $191,910 was deposited; in 1998, $113,289
was deposited; in 1999, $222, 970 was deposited (R. 146 at 86-87). Numerous
bank records and spreadsheets are in evidence confirming these sums coming to
Mr. Garlett.
Mr. Garlett provided no specific evidence concerning how much of this
money went out to cover business expenses, other than testifying that in 1999,
nearly a quarter of a million dollars went through the account, but he kept slightly
under $39,000 (R. 146 at 25).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (5)(b) places the burden on each parent to
establish his or her gross income with appropriate records. It states,
(5)....
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income.
Each parent
shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies
of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court
finds the
verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from
records
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be
substituted for pay
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
Subsection (4) of the same statute indicates that self employed parents may
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deduct only their necessary business expenses in calculating gross income. It
states,
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses
required for self-employment or business operation from gross
receipts. The income and expenses from
self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed tu
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the
parent to satisfy a child
support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business

a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts.
Mr. Garlett provided no

icerning which business expenses

were necessary to allow his business to operate.
He testified that he had no idea how much the family spent each year
because Mrs. Garlett ran the checking account (R. 146 at 84, 87).
She estimated that their family spent between $50,000 and $80,000 a year
(R 146 at 164).
i lie evidence established that their family offivelived a very comfortable
lifestyle. They lived in a 1,657 square foot home on one and a half acres of land,
worth $180,000 to $185,000, and had no mortgage on it (R. 146 at 38,137-38).
They had about $9,000 in equity in a vacant lot worth about $60,000 which lot
was large enough to subdivide (R. 146 at 41,114). They had no credit card debt
(R. 146 at 106). Mrs. Garlett a

rove nice new cars and Mr. Garlett had just

put down $20,000 in cash on a new Dodge pickup truck worth around $27,000 (R.
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146 at 36-37, 58, 74, 85). They had a 20 foot Stratus boat and a 1993 Kit Road
Ranger 27 foot trailer, for which he had paid $25,000 and upon which they owed
between 8 and 9 thousand (R. 146 at 31, 73). They had a fifth wheel trailer
which they gave to her parents (R. 146 at 32).
Mrs. Garlett took numerous trips to Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Las
Vegas, Phoenix, Denver, New Mexico, and Cancun, and had filled the house and
garage with nice furnishing and other things she had purchased (R. 146 at 97-99).
Mr. Garlett had six or seven guns worth around $1,500 and fishing tackle
worth about $4,500, and took his bass fishing boat to Lake Powell, and
participated in bass fishing contests, an expensive hobby (R. 146 at 73-74, 93).
Their personal property is further described in Respondent's Exhibit 18, the
Proposed Settlement.
The Garlett children participated in all manner of sporting events, dancing
and recreation (R. 146 at 212).
Mr. Garlett is a construction contractor who has built thirty-eight homes in
the Moab area since he got his contractor's license in 1987 (R. 146 at 18, 74). He
has the reputation as one of Moab's finest builders (R. 146 at 15).
He testified that there was construction work available, and the parties
stipulated that there is a lot of construction going on in Moab now (R. 146 at 74,
114).10

10

At one point, he claimed that he had no work lined up after his four
month project building a house for Peter Bird, because he had had no one hire
him, despite making efforts to find work (R. 146 at 26-27). He attributed this
decline in business to his moving to Heber for a couple of months, and to Mrs.
Garlett's taking a message off their machine telling people how to reach him (R.
146 at 27).
However, the evidence showed that at the time of trial. Mr. Garlett was also
building a home for Roma and Jay Knuth without compensation, with the
18

To the degree that the trial court's analysis was lacking in specificity, this
was not attributable to his failure to carefully consider the evidence. Rather, it is
the direct result of the failure of Mr. Gariett to present reliable records of his
income, or specific evidence regarding the costs of his business to be deducted
from the deposits into the family checking account. But see Utah Code Ann. §
78-45-7, supra. Even his appellate brief tacitly acknowledges the lack of
evidence on this point, noting that the spreadsheet of bank deposits "apparently"
"included aji business income before business expenses". Opening Brief of
Appellant at 10.
The business expenses of Mr. Gariett were not "highly contested," as were
those in Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 992 (Utah App. 1995), relied on at
page 12 of the Opening Brief of Appellant. Rather, in the instant case, Mr. Gariett
complains of the trial court's failure to makefindingsout of thin air - something no
trial court is required to do.
Because the trial court'sfindingsare sustained by the evidence, and have
not been shown to be clearly erroneous by a proper marshaling of the evidence,
the Court should sustain the trial court's finding regarding Mr. Garlett's income.
D. "Imputed Income"
Mr. Gariett complains that the trial court imputed income without first

expectation that he would later purchase the home from them at a very low cost,
or would be paid for his labor if he could not buy the home (R. 146 at 130,132).
Mr. Gariett also planned to do a roofing side job for someone else while he
was working on the Bird home (R. 146 at 223).
Tim Smith tried to hire Mr. Gariett as a construction contractor in
September or October of 1999, but he would not accept the work because of his
divorce-related problems (R. 146 at 12).
Mr. Gariett testified that he had turned down a lot of work in the past, but
could not think of any he had rejected besides the project for Mr. Smith (R. 146 at
87-88).
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making requisite thresholdfindingthat Mr. Garlett was voluntarily unemployed.
Opening Brief of Appellant at 10-11.
The trial court's finding on this point states,
11. The Petitioner maintains that he had had difficulty maintaining his
business during the past year because of the stress of the divorce.
However, he has turned down at least one opportunity to do
significant work because he did not think he could do it justice in his
present state. Nevertheless, he has received $28,000.00 for his
services during the first seven months of the year 2000, $11,000.00
in direct compensation from Pete Byrd, and $17,000.00 in loans form
Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is building a home. The Court is
persuaded that any reduction in the income of the Petitioner is the
product of this conscious choice. The Courtfindsthat the Petitioner
is capable of earning, and has actually earned, at least $50,000 per
year. His child support obligation will be based on the assumption
that he earns $50,000 per year.
(R. 122-123).
The trial court's memorandum decision explains further,
Chuck maintains that the has had difficulty maintaining his business
during the past year because of the stress of the divorce. He admits
to turning down at least one opportunity to do significant work
because he did not think he could do it justice in his present state.
Nevertheless, he has received $28,000 for his services so far in
2000,[11] $11,000 in direct compensationfromPete Byrd, and
$17,000 in loans from Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is building
a home. The court is persuaded that any reduction in Chuck's
income is the product of this conscious choice. It is not unusual to
see claims that business has gone down when alimony or child
support are about to be calculated. Chuck is capable of, earning,
and has actually earned, at least $50,000 per year.

(R. 59-60).
The trial court's finding that Garlett made at least $50,000 a year did not
involve any imputation of income, given the accurate subsidiary finding that
Garlett made $28,000 in thefirsthalf of the year through $16,000 in wages
earned from Bird, and through the $17,000 loanfromthe Knuths, for whom he

"
The trial court's memorandum decision entered July 10, 2000 (R.
63), and the trial was on June 27, 2000 (R. 52).
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was building a home without any traditional compensation.
Instead, the trial court's ruling is fairly read as recognizing that Mr. Garlett
was trying to reduce his reportable income during the divorce proceedings in
order to reduce his child support and alimony obligations. While the trial court
acknowledged that Mr. Garlett had made a conscious choice to reduce his
income if it were indeed reduced, the trial court did not impute uneamed income
in setting child support and alimony obligations, but found that Mr. Garlett had
actually made at least $50,000 a year, and was capable of doing so.
Because the income assessed was actual, and not imputed, the findings
required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) are not required.

JL

This Court Should Affirm
The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion for a New Trial.
A. The Presumption of Legitimacy
Under Utah law, there is a presumption of legitimacy, that a child born
during the course of the marriage is the legitimate child of the married parties.
See, e.g.. State, in re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990).

See also Utat

Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2.12 This presumption is based on societal interests in

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 provides,
(1) If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any
obligations
subsequent to the marriage, if there is a genuine need arising from
an economic change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if
there are children born or expected, the court may make temporary
and final orders, and subsequently modify the orders, relating to the
parties, their property and obligations, the children and their custody
and parent-time, and the support and maintenance of
the parties and children, as may be equitable.
(2) Except as provided in Section 78-45a-1, children born to the
parties
after the date of their marriage shall be deemed the legitimate
children of both
of the nartifts
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maintaining the sanctity of marriage, and in protecting children from attacks on
their paternity. See In re J.W.F. at 713. The law recognizes that when a child
has a parent-child relationship with an adult, the child has a legitimate expectation
of paternity. See id.
The presumption of legitimacy is a strong one, to be rebutted only by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. See idUnder the common law Lord Mansfield's rule, a presumptive parent may
not testify in a manner undermining a child's legitimacy; the proof must come from
a different source. Id- at 714. The rule to this effect is well grounded in policy,
decency and morality. Id- at n.2.
While the repealed statute which permitted the admission of blood test
evidence to challenge a child's paternity13 is seen as having eroded Lord
Mansfield's rule, Lord Mansfield's rule continues to bar testimony from a
presumptive parent calling into question a child's legitimacy. J.W.F.
Adroitly failing to acknowledge his own position at trial that he is a devoted
father to, and should be granted full custody of all three children, in moving for a
new trial, Mr. Gariett claimed that Mrs. Gariett defrauded the court by failing to
bastardize her child in the trial proceedings (e.g. R. 74). This position is flatly

13

On appeal, Mr. Gariett relies on Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-18, which
was repealed in 1997, but provided in 1996,
In any civil action or in bastardy proceedings in which the
parentage of a person is a relevant fact, the court shall order the
child and alleged parents to submit to blood tests.
Current statutory provisions on paternity suits and blood tests may be found at §§
78-45a-1 through 17.
Neither the repealed nor current statutes governing paternity actions and
genetic tests justify a motion for a new trial which does not comply with the basic
rules of civil procedure discussed herein.
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refuted by reference to the presumption of legitimacy discussed supra.
In the instant matter, the child in question is a six-year-old girl,
but see Opening Brief of Appellant at 17 (referring to the child in question as a
son), who had lived her life believing that Mr. Garlett is her wonderful father, in
accordance with the evidence he presented at trial in seeking sole custody of her
and her siblings. See, g ^ , R. 146 at 8-9,45-46,110-113,129.
Upsetting this child's expectation that Mr. Garlett is her father at this point
obviously involves far more than the "quite simple" remedy of recalculating the
child support award. Compare Opening Brief of Appellant at 16 (arguing to this
effect); with M- at 15 (arguing that Mrs. Garlett would not be prejudiced because if
Taylor's paternity is reopened, the property distribution will remain the same, and
only the child support amount and division of equity in the marital home will be
effected); and wjjh, e ^ , J.W.F.. supra.
B. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, SURPRISE, MISTAKE, OR EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT
Mr. Garlett claims that the trial court should have permitted him to
challenge Taylor's paternity under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which
provides,
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representativefroma
final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (z) newly discovered
evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
$4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
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discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have

prospective

application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1),
(2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be

by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
For the first time on appeal, counsel for Mr. Gariett tries to cast the DNA
test results as newly discovered evidence, by arguing,
Additionally, the evidence was unavailable to the Petitioner at the
time of trial and could not reasonably be acquired by the
Respondent until July 21,2000, which was the date the natural father
of the minor child, Taylor, submitted to genetic testing through the
DNA Diagnostic center.
Opening Brief of Appellant at 16.
Assuming arguendo that this Court is inclined to consider this argument
raised for the first time on appeal,14 the Court should examine the DNA test
results appended to Mr. Garlett's opening brief as Exhibit D, and confirm that the
DNA test was one of exclusion, and that the two people tested were the child and
Mr. Gariett, not some third party who was unavailable prior to or during the trial.
Mr. Gariett next claims without any record support that he anticipated that

14

But see, ejk, Doe v. Hafen. (requiring parties to articulate arguments
in the trial court to preserve them for appeal), supra.
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Mrs. Garlett would testify at trial that Taylor was not his. Opening Brief of
Appellant at 16-17. Bui sse Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(7) and (a)(9)
and (e) (requiring parties to provide record citations).
There was no agreement that Mrs. Garlett would aid Mr. Garlett at trial in
disproving Taylor's paternity, as is blatantly demonstrated by Mr. Garlett's
consistent strategy to seek full custody of all three Garlett children, and Mrs.
Garlett's consistent recognition of all three children born during the marriage as
belonging to the Garlett parents. See, &&, R. 146 at 8-9,45-46,110-113,129.
As was explained above, under Lord Mansfield's rule, neither Mr. nor Mrs.
Garlett could have testified in a manner casting doubt on Taylor's paternity. See.
IL&, JTW.F.
Mr. Garlett mischaracterizes the actions of his trial counsel as raising the
issue of Taylor's paternity, Opening Brief of Appellant at 16-17, when in fact, his
counsel was seeking to establish that Mr. Garlett rejected a job offer because he
was under distress, and not because he was voluntarily underemployed. See R.
146 at 28. The fact that there was no anticipated plan to undermine Taylor's
legitimacy is again demonstrated by the fact that when Mr. Garlett made
reference to learning things about his youngest child, counsel for Mrs. Garlett
objected and raised Lord Mansfield's rule, and counsel for Mr. Garlett indicated
that they had no problem steering away from the area (R. 146 at 28). Neither she
nor Mr. Garlett made any effort to deviate from his claim at trial that he was a
loving father to all three Garlett children, and wanted full custody of them in his
new home. See, e.^, R. 146 at 8-9,45-46,110-113,129.
Mr. Garlett argues on appeal as though his trial counsel betrayed him by
not counseling him to get DNA tests before trial, and by failing to object to the
invocation of Lord Mansfield's rule, and claims that this "surprise" justified relief
25

from judgment. Opening Brief of Appellant at 17.
Mr. Gariett cannot cite to the record to support his indictment of his trial
counsel, because he never made this claim attacking her performance in the trial
court, and hence, she has had no fair opportunity to answer such allegations in
the record. £yj §£§, &&, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(7) and (a)(9)
and (e) (requiring parties to provide record citations). £ 1 Doe v. Hafen.
supra (requiring claims to be madefirstin the trial court).
As is clear from Mr. Garlett's testimony and efforts to paint himself as a
wonderful father deserving full custody of all three Gariett children, see, §_£*, R.
146 at 8-9, 45-46,110-113,129, and as is confirmed by the verified response to
the motion for a new trial (R. 77-83), Mr. Gariett was aware prior to trial that there
were questions as to whether or not he was the biological father of Taylor, but
consciously chose to claim her as his own and continue with their six year fatherdaughter relationship.
In short, Mr. Garlett's claims of fraud, newly discovered evidence, surprise,
mistake and excusable neglect, are not supported by, but are flatly contradicted
by the record. Because Mr. Gariett did not comply with the rules in seeking a new
trial by establishing a legal basis for raising this claim after trial, the trial court
properly ruled against the motion for a new trial. Compare Ostler v. Buhler. 957
P.2d 205 (Utah 1998)(trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying relief
from judgment under rule 60(b), where record disproved claims of surprise,
mistake and neglect); Boyce v. Boyce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980)(divorce decree
properly set aside on the basis of husband's fraud in failing to comply with pretrial
discovery duties, in understating the value of assets, and in trying to hide assets
with family members).

11L
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This Court Should Affirm
The Trial Court's Alimony Award.
A. Waiver
Mr. Garlett did not object to the trial court's memorandum decision entered
July 10, 2000, which included the trial court's first analysis of the alimony issue
(R. 59-62). Nor did Mr. Garlett raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial
court's analysis in his motion for a new trial filed September 21, 2000, nor did he
file any objection to the trial court's findings and conclusions, which reflects the
analysis challenged on appeal and wasfiledon February 21, 2001 (R. 122-124).
fiyi §£g Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (permitting parties to move the trial court
within ten days of thefinaljudgment to amendfindingsor make additional
findings, permitting such a motion to be made in conjunction with motion for a
new trial).
On appeal, he has made no claim of plain error, or otherwise justified this
Court's consideration of this issue for thefirsttime on appeal.
Because Mr. Garlett did not notify the trial court of the error claimed on
appeal despite having had ample opportunity to do so, the issue is not preserved
for appeal. 5gg, &&, Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App.), cjgrL denied.
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)(party must object in a clear and concise fashion and
thereby give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue).
B. Failure to Marshal the Evidence
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(9) provides, "A party challenging a
factfindingmustfirstmarshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding." A party must assemble all evidence supporting the trial court's findings
of fact and demonstrate that, even when all reasonable inferences are drawn in
conformity with the findings, thefindingsare clearly erroneous. £gg, e.g..
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Gravson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
Mr. Gariett acknowledges his duty to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings regarding the alimony award, but fails to marshal the
evidence, and instead mischaracterizes and criticizes the trial court's findings.
Sfig Opening Brief of Appellant at 18-22. Again, Mr. Gariett never quotes from
the findings he is supposedly marshaling the evidence in support of.
Because he has failed to marshal the evidence, this Court may assume
that the evidence sustains the trial court's findings. See, ejg^, Utah Med. Prods,
v. Searcy. 958 P.2d 228,233 (Utah 1998)(because party failed to marshal
evidence court was required to assume that the evidence sustained the findings).
See a!SQ Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App 370, 995 P.2d 14; cert, denied, 4 P.3d
1289 (Utah 2000)(party may not shift burden of analysis to the appellate court).
C. Marshaling the evidence
The trial court ordered Mr. Gariett to pay Mrs. Gariett $1,650 per month;
$1050 per month in child support and $600 per month in alimony (e.g. R. 125).
The trial court's findings of fact underlying the alimony award state, in
relevant part,
10. The Petitioner has maintained that his income has
averaged about $30,000.00 per year and his federal income tax
returns reflect income in that range for 1994-1998, however the
lifestyle and standard of living of the parties supports the position of
the Respondent that the family spent $50,000.00 to $80,000.00 per
year.
11. The Petitioner maintains that he had had difficulty
maintaining his business during the past year because of the stress
of the divorce. However, he has turned down at least one
opportunity to do significant work because he did not think he could
do it justice in his present state. Nevertheless, he has received
$28,000.00 for his services during thefirstseven months of the year
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2000, $11,000.00 in direct compensation from Pete Byrd, and
$17,000.00 in loans form Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is
building a home. The Court is persuaded that any reduction in the
income of the Petitioner is the product of this conscious choice. The
Court finds that the Petitioner is capable of earning, and has actually
earned, at least $50,000 per year. His child support obligation will be
based on the assumption that he earns $50,000 per year.
12. The Respondent has sought employment, but has limited
skills and has not qualified for jobs paying more than minimum wage.
Her employment has been seasonal as well. Taking the seasonality
of her employment into account, as well as her need to be home to
care for the children when they are not in school, the Court will base
the Respondent's child support calculation on the expectation that
she will earn minimum wage for 30 hours per week.
13. The Respondent should be entitled to the tax exemption
and credits for the children, but the Petitioner may purchase them
from her annually by paying her what they save her in taxes.
14. The Respondent is entitled to alimony for the next sixteen
years, which is the same as the duration of the marriage. Alimony
will be taxable to her.
15. The respondent has demonstrated a need for $2,134.50
per month to cover expenses for herself and the children.
16. The Petitioner is able to pay the anticipated child support
and alimony.
(R. 122-123).
In assessing the trial court's reasoning, it is also appropriate to refer to his
original memorandum decision. See, e.g.. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96,102
(Utah 1986)(assessing supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law and
the trial court's memorandum decision in a divorce case)
The portion of the memorandum decision relating to alimony states,
Chuck maintains that his income has averaged about $30,000
per year. His federal income tax returns reflect incomes in that range
for 1994-98. He admits "fudging" his income by $5,000 during at
least two of those years. Jennifer claims that the family spent
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$50,000 to $80,000 per year. The court has heard testimony about
the possessions accumulated by Chuck and Jennifer, as well as
their lifestyle, andfindsJennifer's position better supported by that
evidence. Chuck maintains that the has had difficulty maintaining his
business during the past year because of the stress of the divorce.
He admits to turning down at least one opportunity to do significant
work because he did not think he could do it justice in his present
state. Nevertheless, he has received $28,000 for his services so far
in 2000,[15] $11,000 in direct compensation from Pete Byrd, and
$17,000 in loans from Roma and Ray Knuth, for whom he is building
a home. The court is persuaded that any reduction in Chuck's
income is the product of this conscious choice. It is not unusual to
see claims that business has gone down when alimony or child
support are about to be calculated. Chuck is capable of, earning,
and has actually earned, at least $50,000 per year. His child support
obligation will be based on the assumption that he earns $50,000 per
year. Jennifer has sought employment, but has limited skills and has
not qualified for jobs paying more than minimum wage. Her
employment has been seasonal as well. Taking the seasonality of
her employment into account, as well as her need to be home to
care for the children when they are not in school, the court will base
Jennifer's child support calculation on the expectation that she will
earn minimum wage for 30 hours per week. Jennifer will be entitled
to the tax exemption and credits for the children, but Chuck may
purchase them from her annually by paying her what they save her in
taxes.
Jennifer is entitled to alimony. She will receive about $1050 in
child support. She will earn about $600 per month in take home pay.
She has demonstrated a need for $2,134.50 per month to cover
expenses for herself and the children. Alimony will be taxable to her.
The court will award $600 per month alimony with the expectation
that she will net $500 to cover her expenses. Chuck is able to pay
this amount. If Jennifer and the children can live on $2,134.50 per
month, Chuck can live on what remains of his monthly income after
he pays $1650 in child support and alimony.
(R. 59-61).

15

The trial court's memorandum decision entered July 10, 2000 (R.
63), and the trial was on June 27, 2000 (R. 52).
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The evidence amply supports the trial court's analysis and findings.
The evidence supporting Mr. Garlett's level of income at at least $50,000 a
year is summarized in the statement of facts, and specifically marshaled in Point
I, supra.
In Point III of his brief, Mr. Garlett asserts that his income should be
assessed at $3,000 a month, because Mrs. Garlett testified that at times he could
be very frugal, and may have lived on $18,000.00 in the first six months of the
year. £g§ Opening Brief of Appellant at 21, citing to R. 146 at 169.
Assuming that Mr. Garlett spent $18,000.00 in that six months does not
account for the seventeen thousand dollar loan the Knuths provided in that same
time period (R. 146 at 43), the home he was building for the Knuths without
compensation, with the expectation that he would later purchase the home from
them at a very low cost, or would be paid for his labor if he could not buy the
home (R. 146 at 130,132), or otherwise refute the evidence concerning his
earning history and capacity, and the wealthy lifestyle enjoyed by the Garlett
family, discussed supra.
Mrs. Garlett has been a full time mother to the three Garlett children, and
only occasionally has worked part time in minimum wage positions, which were
largely seasonal in the resort town of Moab (R. 146 at 16-17,180,193). Mr.
Garlett conceded that Mrs. Garlett has the wage-earning power of a high school
student (R. 146 at 82).
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Mrs. Garlett submitted a detailed accounting establishing monthly family
expenses at $2134.50 a month, which did not include vacations (R. 146 at 166).
Mr. Garlett did not dispute her estimates, but testified that he had no idea how
much the family spent each year because Mrs. Garlett ran the checking account
(R. 146 at 84, 87).
At the time of trial, Mr. Garlett was living in his trailer at the Knuth
construction site, and the only specific information he provided about his financial
expenses was that he was paying his new romantic interest $400 a month (R.
146 at 53,130-31,217).
He submitted Exhibit 14, a financial declaration, listing his monthly net
income at $2154, and listing his total monthly expenses at $2,586.12 and monthly
payments at $275.12. According to this document, Mr. Garlett was spending
$707.24 per month more than he was making without any provisions for his family
- a position that is radically inconsistent with the Garlett family lifestyle. As with
Mr. Garlett's "fudged" tax returns, the trial court was not bound to base his
findings concerning Mr. Garlett's income on the patently unreliable evidence
provided by Mr. Garlett, and acted well within his discretion in finding that Mr.
Garlett made at least $50,000 dollars a year, in accordance with Mrs. Garlett's
testimony and the evidence demonstrating their comfortable lifestyle.
See Statement of Facts, supra.
Because the trial court's findings regarding his income are sustained by the
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evidence, and have not been shown to be clearly erroneous by a proper
marshaling of the evidence, the Court should sustain the trial court's findings
regarding alimony.
D. Adequacy of Findings
Mr. Garlett provides a lengthy discussion concerning the factors a trial court
must consider in fashioning an alimony award. Se_e_ Opening Brief of Appellant at
18-19. It is clear from reading the trial court's analysis, supra, that he considered
all the appropriate evidence, which was largely undisputed, and considered the
pertinent legal criteria and made adequate findings. £ge_, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5.16

16

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 discusses the criteria to be considered
prior to the issuance of an alimony order. It states, in relevant part,
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(Hi) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or
operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase
in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the
payor spouse
or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in
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accordance with
Subsection (7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of
living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration,
when
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize
the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property
and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity
has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the
court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and
awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration
dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage,
the court may
consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the
marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material
change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
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The only finding Mr. Garlett took issue with at trial or takes issue with on
appeal is the trial court's analysis of his income. See Opening Brief of Appellant
at 18-22.
As noted in Point I, to the degree that the tn

> assessment of Mr.

Garlett's income is wanting in specificity, this is not explained by any failure of the
trial court to consider appropriate evidence or criteria, but rather, stems from Mr.
Garlett's failure to carry his burden to establish his level of income with specific,
reliable evidence. Sge. Point I, supra.
IV,

alimony
to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the
decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify
that
action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of
the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
Subsection (7).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability
to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the
court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the
number of
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
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THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 40, when an attorney signs a brief,
this represents that the attorney has read the brief and "that to the best of his or
her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not
frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33." Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 33 defines a brief as "frivolous" if it is "one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law," and defines a brief filed "for
the purpose of delay" if it is "one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper." Rules 33
and 40 each permit the Court to order a party to pay the opponent up to double
the attorney's fees incurred to respond to a brief which is frivolous orfiledfor
purposes of delay, if an inquiry by the Court confirms that such an award is
justified. See alSQ Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (permitting various sanctions
in similar circumstances).
While the law recognizes that courts should reserve the imposition of
sanctions for serious violations of the rules in order to avoid discouraging parties
from appealing in proper cases, sanctions are appropriate if appeals have no
reasonable likelihood of prevailing and are obviously lacking in merit. See, &&,
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156,162 (Utah App. 1989).
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In this case, the Court should issu

Garlett

should not be ordered to pay double Mrs. Garlett's attorney's fees on appeal,
MI HI Mi Garlett's appeal is legally frivolous and filed for purposes of delay, as
those terms are defined by Utah

RUIP

.apellate Procedure 33.

In Points I and III of Mr. Garlett's brief, he purports to challenge the
adequacy of the trial court's findings regarding income and alimony, without
acknowledging that these

not preserved in the trial court, or

explaining why they should be reviewed for the first time on appeal. Sse Opening
Brief of Appellant at 2. The points do not quote from the trial court's findings, but
mischaracten^e

IIWMM,

i challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the

court's findings without marshaling the evidence.

uening Brief of Appellant

at 8 throughl 2 and 18 through 22.
The brief does not discuss the statute upon which those issues turn, Utah
Code Ann. §78-45-7, which placed the

Garlett to establish his level

of income and identify necessary business expenses to be deducted in the trial
«

ather than mischaracterizing and attacking the trial court's findings on the

issue of his income resulting in

>upport and alimony awards, Mr. Garlett

should have recognized that he did not carry his burden of establishing his
income or reasonable business expenses with reliable evidence in the trial court,
and should have abstained from appealing on frivolous grounds and for improper
purposes. See Points I and III of this brief, supra.
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In Point II of Mr. Garlett's brief, he seeks to disturb the paternity of a sixyear-old child while minimizing the serious ramifications of the claim, ignoring the
governing law, Lord Mansfield's rule, relying on a repealed statute, and misstating
the relevant facts. £§§ Opening Brief of Appellant at 13 through 17.
Mr. Garlett not only misidentifies the gender of the child whose familial
identity is in jeopardy, but also claims that his belated efforts to challenge the
paternity of the child are justified by either the need to test the "natural father,"
when no such test was performed or required, or by trial counsel's and Mrs.
Garlett's failure to follow through with a non-existent plan to bastardize this child.
See id. Mr. Garlett's claims are unsupported by the record and fabricated. Sge_
Point II of his brief, supra. Point II of Mr. Garlett's brief, like Points I and III, is
legally frivolous and was filed for improper purposes.
Under the governing law discussed above,

this Court should order

appropriate sanctions. Compare Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App.
1987){appeal from alimony award and property distribution was frivolous where
evidence and law were misstated and mischaracterized).

38

Conclusion
This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings in all respects and conduct
the Rule 33 procedures prerequisite to the awarding of attorney's fees.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2001.

MORGAN
Counsel for Mrs. Garlett
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I hereby certify
true and correct

hand-delivered/mailed, first class postage pre-paid, two

copies of the foregoing to M?

Jarrod H.

Jennings, Corporon and Williams, P.C. , 808 East South Temple, Salt Lake City,
I'Hli HIHl,1 Ihi!. 'Hi day of November, 2001.

'MORGAN
Counsel for Mrs. Garlett
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Addendum ~A~

30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage — Orders relating to parties, property,
and children — Legitimacy of children.
(1) If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligations subsequent to the
marriage, if there is a genuine need arisingfroman economic change of circumstances due to the
marriage, or if there are children bora or expected, the court may make temporary andfinalorders,
and subsequently modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and obligations, the
children and their custody and parent-time, and the support and maintenance of the parties and
children, as may be equitable
(2) Except as provided in Section 78-45a-l, children born to the parties after the date of their
marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both of the parties.
Amended by Chapter 255,2001 General Session
Download Code Section
WP 6/7/8
|
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001

|

2,128 Bytes
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Addendum ~B~

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care ot parties and children —
Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to
the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in
every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties1 separate, current addresses: and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery
Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for. it may
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution
of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining parent-timerightsof parents and visitationrightsof grandparents and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered
under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is
made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 fees expended
by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and
not asserted or defended against in good faith
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 7832-12J5 where a visitation or parent-timerighthas been previously granted by the court, the court
may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(i\) the length of the marriage;

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse;
and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill
by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school
during the marriage
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (7Xa). However, the court shall
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropi uti circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective
standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income
of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing
the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition
which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the
time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(in) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the (i»i\<ti itu \ m if h
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (7)
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's
improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party
pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former
spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and hisrightsare
determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another
person.
Amended by Chapter 255,2001 General Session
Download Code Section
WP 6/7/8
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Addendum ~C~

In any civil action or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a person
is a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit to
blood tests.
Current statutory provisions on paternity suits and blood tests may be found at §§
78-45a-1 through 17.
Neither the repealed nor current statutes governing paternity actions and
genetic tests justify a motion for a new trial which does not comply with the basic
rules of civil procedure discussed herein.

Addendum ~D~

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support - Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the obligor or obligee or adjustment
under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been made.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic adjustment for
prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a
showing of a material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award required by the
guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, or a petition
to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has beenfiled,the court determining the amount
of prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may be granted.
(3) If the courtfindssufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish support
after considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child
or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all arrearages based
upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this chapter.
Amended by Chapter 53,1998 General Session
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Addendum ~E~

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection
(3); and
(b) incomefromsalaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes,
dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimonyfromprevious marriages,
annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers1 compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeanstested" government programs.
(2) Incomefromearned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job.
However, if and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and
consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern
in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or
General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross
receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be
reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child
support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level
may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business
income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-todate pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returnsfromat least the most
recent year unless the courtfindsthe verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income
from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs,
employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or
overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed,
the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and afindingmade that the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and
probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings
for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed
at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the
judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter

specificfindingsof fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation,
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount
of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage;
(Hi) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the
home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a child
support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security
Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as
child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the
potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to
a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
Amended by Chapter 116,2001 General Session
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78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. The father of a child that is or may be bom outside of
marriage is liable to the same extent as the father of a child bom within marriage, whether or not the
child is bom alive, for the reasonable expense of the mothers pregnancy and confinement and for the
education, necessary support, and any funeral expenses for the child. For purposes of child support
collection, a child bom outside of marriage includes a child bom to a married woman by a man other
than her husband if that paternity has been established.
Amended by Chapter 245, 1990 General Session
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Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in
the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such
parties. The list should be set «»u? or. a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of c< • * ? * -? • •

•

• auaendum, with page references.

(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and i\iih parotid u m u n s .— *--• >
and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement sho^*-

-

• >-l • •

the appellate-court.

(5) A statement of the issues presc^i.d lor review, including for each issue tin «i1arnl;ii,it <il ai'iprlLilt"
review with supporting authority; and
vA; citation to the in i«"il showing fiuil the issiu .vas pieseiwJ in the trial toitrf or
/r>

" n statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court

vo) constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the
appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice,
and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.

(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course
of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule,
* 8» Summary of arguments. I he summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct
sensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repel • »"nn
.: heading under which the argument is arranged,
{?) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the
trial court. * ith citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding,
(10) A

conclusion stati*

telief sought.

(11) \n addendum to the brief oi a .iu_wAent that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph.
The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick.
If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum
shall contain a copy of:

(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief
but not reproduced verbatim, in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any
court > r-.ion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly
published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the
appeal, such as the challenged instructions,findingsof fact and conclusions of law, memorandum
decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to
construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. Fhe brief of the appellee shall com v
of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:

is of pai *

(a)

(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the
appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included m t
appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.

^pellan1

(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues
presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)
(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate
court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to
keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the
taxpayer," etc
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as
paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or
agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published
depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as
marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made
to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and
received or rejected. .
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages,
and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables
of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as
^.•Muired K paragraph (a) of this rule In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets

forth the lend*1
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appear »> ^ed. :n^ purn 1/.5;: i-*\
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unles * i\u . •<-:
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed so par; ^
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in
the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in
length. The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by
the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length The
appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which
contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/crossappellant's first brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of
authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission,,, of the court The court shall grant
reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases in\ olving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either
may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief
of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the
attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed or ner oral argument but before decision, a
party may promptly advise the cleric of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An
original letter and nine copies shall befiledin the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies
shall befiledin the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a
point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the
reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days offilingand shall
be similarly limited.
(]) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with act . .* ,
logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, or motion or
sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
'k i ouei covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule
Advisory Committee Note. Rule 24 (aV
-u> . dah appellate courts have long held.
See In re Beesley, 883 R2d 134j», I a -„,
• . . .near v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Utah 1987), "To successfully appeal a tnai •»'*>-' * dings of fact appellate counsel must play the
devil's advocate.' must extricate from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the veryfindingsthe
appellant resists/'1 ONEIDA/SLIQ v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,
1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rel MS v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216,1218 (Utah
App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App 1989); State v. Moore^ 802 P.2d 732, 738.
39 (Utah A pp. 1990).

The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard ol
review and citation of supporting authority
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal cay;. * ^
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is eitherfrivolousor for delay,
it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34 an f/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be j
^
party or by the party's attorney
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal motion, brief, or othei paper s
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, ot mA based on a uood la.ih argument
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed tor the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the partyfilingthe appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper
(« ni Ptot i ulures.

< i) The court may award damages upon request of any pau> o> . v. .; ,<•. ; motion A ,;a.u nu^
request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's monon io Mammary disposition under
Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part; of a party's response to a motion or othe; \w •(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the
party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order
to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to show
cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested 'by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing

Adde ium ~±~

Rule 40, Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctior(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party represented b> an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active member in good standing
of the Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her business
address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper and state the party's address and telephone
number. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other
papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the
best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not
frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other
paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, after reasonable notice and an
opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action
against any attorney or person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the court, or for
failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a member of
the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
'-' ?ule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to Imnl oi III|K,I tin:
fs inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before the bar of
another state or a foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this state, may appear, pro
hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration- A separate motion is not
required in the appellate court if the attorney has previously been admitted pro hac vice in the lower
tribunal, but the attorney shall file in the appellate court a notice of appearance pro hac vice to that
effect.

Addendum' -

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, amendfindingsof feet and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the courtJury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent
to any general or special verdict, or to afindingon any question submitted to them by the court, by
resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of
the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon
affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing
affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply
affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be
signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court
(whether by signing,filing,submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified,
are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separatelyfromother motions
or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm
may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific
conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, lawfirm,or party to show
cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to
what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly

situated Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), tiie sanction may consist of, or
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or
all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision
(bX2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order
to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a
violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to disclosures
and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules
26 through 37.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The 1997 amendments conform state Rule 11 with federal Rule 11. One difference between the rules
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible for violations by a member of the firm. Federal Rule
11(c)(1)(A) states: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a lawfirmshall be held jointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees." Under the federal rule, joint
responsibility is presumed unless the judge determines not to impose joint responsibility. State Rule
1 l(cXlXA) provides: I n appropriate circumstances, a lawfirmmay be held jointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, members, and employees." Under the state rule, joint
responsibility is not presumed, and the judge may impose joint responsibility in appropriate
circumstances. What constitutes appropriate circumstances is left to the discretion of the judge, but
might include: repeated violations, especially after earlier sanctions; firm-wide sanctionable
practices; or a sanctionable practice approved by a supervising attorney and committed by a
subordinate.
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Rule 52. Findings by the court
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth thefindingsof fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as thefindingsof
the court. It will be sufficient if thefindingsof fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enterfindingsof fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the
court may amend itsfindingsor make additionalfindingsand may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. Whenfindingsof fact
are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to support thefindingsmay thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has
made in the district court an objection to suchfindingsor has made either a motion to amend them, a
motionforjudgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver offindingsof fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arisingfromoversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the
appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance ofjustice relieve a party or his legal
representative from afinaljudgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)fraud(whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action.
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Rule 3.1. Meritorious claims and contentions.
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A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.
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COMMENT
The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the
client's case, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both
procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate
may proceed However, the law is not always clear and never is static.
Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be
taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.
Thefilingof an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not
frivolous merely because the facts have notfirstbeen fully substantiated or
because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such
action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's
position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the
client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing
or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a
good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.
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Rule 3J« Candor toward the tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
Tbi*f*«^J &t Outsit PH&CK*

(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
JRtii$s of tin* C?&h &«e Bi$
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
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(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures.
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(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the
proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes
is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material
facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
COMMENT
The advocate's task is to present the client's case with persuasive force.
Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client is
qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. However, an
advocate does not vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause; the tribunal is
responsible for assessing its probative value.
Representations by a Lawyer
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for
litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters
asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the

